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23 November 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



State Dept. review completed

NGA Review Complete

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 November 1962

THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 21 Nov)

CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS Page 1

Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the IL-28 jet bombers from Cuba probably reflected a mounting apprehension that the US would otherwise impose more stringent quarantine measures. The decision confirmed Fidel Castro's inability to influence the outcome and was another blow to his prestige at home and abroad. However, in his letter of 19 November to U Thant announcing that he would not obstruct withdrawal of the IL-28s, Castro had reiterated his threat to shoot down US reconnaissance planes and his refusal to permit inspection in Cuba. A number of Latin American governments will continue to regard Cuba as a threat as long as Castro remains and even after Soviet offensive weapons are withdrawn. [REDACTED]

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KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE Page 4

Khrushchev has resorted to another major administrative reorganization in an attempt to cope with economic problems. In his speech to the central committee on 19 October, he called in effect for dividing the party into two separate organizations, one to control industry and one to control agriculture. This scheme will strengthen political control but is likely to disrupt both the party and economic management. It provides none of the material incentives which would improve economic performance over the long run. [REDACTED]

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THE BULGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS Page 6

Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization prevailed at the Bulgarian party congress last week. Party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov overcame an entrenched Stalinist opposition to emerge as undisputed leader of the party. However, the speeches of foreign delegates provided a possible indication of the extent of Khrushchev's loss of prestige in the Cuban affair. Only 12 of some 65 foreign delegates to the congress specifically praised Moscow's Cuba policy. [REDACTED]

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Page 8

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China moved closer to open denunciation of each other in their comments on the fifth anniversary of the International Communist Declaration of 1957. Although neither party goes so far as to name its opponent, their attacks are specific enough to destroy the facade of amity which they have erected in an attempt to hide their deepening split. Soviet efforts to maintain friendly relations with India despite the Sino-Indian border dispute will continue to embitter Sino-Soviet relations. There are

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Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003800100001-1

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 November 1962

some tentative indications that China may reduce the level of its diplomatic representation in some bloc capitals. [REDACTED]

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THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER Page 10

Communist China capped a week of military successes along the eastern end of the Sino-Indian border with a sudden announcement that it would cease firing all along the disputed border on 22 November. In addition, Peiping said it was prepared to begin a unilateral withdrawal on 1 December to positions behind the "line of actual control" of November 1959. It made clear, however, that it would renew the offensive if India tried to restore its pre - October 1962 border position. The Indians have reacted cautiously to this new attempt by Peiping to nail down its extensive claims in Ladakh in exchange for clear Indian title to the North East Frontier Agency. They probably will honor the cease-fire, but will find other Chinese proposals unacceptable.

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THE SITUATION IN LAOS Page 13

Souvanna Phouma does not now appear ready to carry out his threat to resign, but the problems which provoked the threat remain. The Pathet Lao continue to be uncooperative and have increased their pressure on neutralist units in and about the Plaine des Jarres.

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[REDACTED] Right-ist leader Phoumi, meanwhile, is scheduled to head a trade delegation to the USSR to conclude negotiations for a commercial accord between the two countries.

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THE YEMEN SITUATION Page 14

The UAR has been putting more troops and supplies into Yemen to help consolidate the revolutionary regime. It continues to receive Soviet assistance for its operations in Yemen.

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[REDACTED] UAR propaganda attacks on other Arab countries have become more strident.

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CONGO DEVELOPMENTS Page 16

The UN has reportedly dropped plans to move forces into the southern Katangan mining towns, but remains convinced that Tshombé must be pressed rather than persuaded if there is to be significant progress on the Katanga problem. The Katangans continue to fear some new military move against them, and Tshombé has repeated his professions of support for the UN reintegration plan. Adoula is urging that the Western powers should apply economic sanctions against Tshombé.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 November 1962

FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE Page 17

The strength shown by Gaullist candidates on 18 November in the first round of the National Assembly elections confronts non-Communist opponents of De Gaulle with the thorny question of whether to cooperate with the Communist Party (PCF). This problem will be especially acute for the Socialists. Seeking to exploit the situation, the PCF has emphasized that it is the only anti - De Gaulle party to better its 1958 showing in the first round; it can be expected to claim credit for the second-ballot election of non-Communist anti-Gaullists on 25 November.

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COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS Page 20

A breakthrough is not yet in sight on Britain's bid for Common Market membership. Limited progress at the 15-17 November negotiating session followed the abortive ministerial meeting in late October, but the two sides are still far from agreement on a number of major points. Among these are the financial regulations under the EEC's common agricultural policy, on which the Six themselves are seriously divided. The EEC's executive commission is increasingly concerned that failure to resolve these internal differences at a meeting now scheduled for 3-5 December would not only block further progress on Britain's accession, but would also have a seriously disruptive effect on the community itself.

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SECRET

BRIEFS

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 November 1962

ARGENTINE ELECTIONS ANNOUNCED Page 22

The Argentine interior minister announced on 19 November that national, provincial, and municipal elections would be held on 16 June 1963. Revised political regulations change the electoral system to proportional representation and call for the participation of all political groups which act within the law, thus indicating the possibility of Peronist candidates. The regulations were drafted after consultation with all political groups but are evoking loud complaints reflecting partisan interests. A Defense Ministry communiqué indicates that the top military commanders support the political plan.

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

AIR DEFENSE IN CUBA Page 1

A comprehensive air defense system employing Soviet equipment and apparently controlled by Soviet personnel has been established in Cuba during recent months. This effective system--originally intended primarily to defend Soviet offensive missile installations--continues to pose a threat to air surveillance of Cuban territory. A year or more would be required before all elements of this system could be effectively manned by Cubans if the Soviets decided to withdraw.

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THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ARMY IN INDONESIA Page 7

When Indonesia's state of emergency is lifted, probably next May, there is likely to be a substantial change in the role of the army. Since 1957, when the emergency was declared to combat growing provincial pressure for local autonomy, the army has come to control broad areas of civil life, and Sukarno has also used it as the major counterweight to the Communist Party. Although he apparently intends to adjust the army's relationship to civil government, his continuing need for military support makes it almost certain that significant army political influence will persist. The army's anti-Communist effort, however, is likely to suffer.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

WEEKLY REVIEW

CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev's decision to remove the IL-28 (Beagle) jet bombers from Cuba probably reflected a mounting apprehension that the US would otherwise impose more stringent quarantine measures and again confront Moscow with the choice of risking countermeasures or accepting another backdown without a face-saving commitment from the US. In any case, the decision confirmed Fidel Castro's inability to influence the outcome and was another blow to the Cuban leader's prestige.

Castro's "agreement" to allow the removal of the IL-28s --apparently given only when it became clear the US was about to take additional steps--was set forth in his 19 November letter to U Thant. It was publicized by Havana shortly after the first official meeting between the Cuban leader and Mikoyan since 6 November. In light of the President's impending news conference, Mikoyan may have warned Castro that unless the Cuban leader issued a statement on the removal of the IL-28s, a new crisis might arise in which the USSR would be unable to prevent new moves by the US against Cuba.

The absence of any reference in the new letter to Castro's "five points"--except the demand for a cessation of violations of Cuban airspace--suggests that Castro has been obliged to put them aside as conditions for the settlement of the crisis between the US and the Soviet Union.

In his letter to U Thant, Castro contradicted earlier statements by lesser Cuban officials by admitting that the IL-28s "belong to the Soviet

Government." This position is also in marked contrast with Soviet propaganda commentary of the previous week which, in the first reference to the bombers, claimed that "Soviet-made military planes are the property of the Cuban armed forces." Moscow's increasing concern over imminent US moves to intensify pressures on Cuba and the USSR was reflected in Soviet commentary on the "continuing military buildup in Florida" and "provocative and warmongering statements from even responsible government officials."

Moscow Radio's domestic broadcasts of 21 November reported without further comment President Kennedy's decision to lift the quarantine on Cuba. A short TASS account of the President's news conference quoted his remarks on the possibilities for safeguarding peace in the Caribbean, concluding with his reiteration of the September statement that "we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere." TASS also announced that as a result of the President's decision special alert measures for Soviet and Warsaw Pact armed forces have been terminated.

Moscow's initial comment on the President's news conference is contained in a Spanish broadcast to Cuba on 21 November. While claiming that the President's decision to lift the quarantine demonstrated that the US "is embarking on the practical fulfillment of the obligations... which it had previously assumed," the broadcast went on to call for more effective guarantees for Cuban security.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Future Soviet Moves

Having apparently convinced Castro that he must avoid provoking another crisis, Moscow will probably attempt to press the United States for formal assurances against an invasion of Cuba before agreement is reached on the framework of a general settlement of other problems relating to Cuba. The Soviet Union will probably continue to insist that, while it is not opposed to adequate inspection and verification safeguards, Cuban leaders will not permit inspection teams on Cuban soil. Moscow is likely to try to counter US insistence on this issue by pressing for endorsement of reciprocal UN observation posts in the US as well as Cuba.

Mikoyan now has been in Cuba for three weeks. The length of his stay reflects the serious obstacles he has probably encountered in his talks with Castro and implies that the Soviet leader is engaged in a fundamental reassessment of the Soviet commitment and future role in Cuba. Castro was not present at an 18 November dinner for Mikoyan hosted by Cuban President Dorticos. In an effort to mollify the Cuban leader, Mikoyan is apparently discussing the question of increased Soviet economic and technical assistance. Moscow TASS reported that Mikoyan and Che Guevara had talks on 16 November relating to "specific questions" on such assistance. On 20 November it was reported by an unconfirmed press source in Havana that a new three-year economic aid agreement had been signed by Castro and Mikoyan.

Castro's Position

The content of Castro's latest letter to U Thant and the circumstances suggesting it was sent as a result of Soviet pressure may constitute a further setback to Castro's prestige at home and abroad. Although probably not as serious a setback as Khrushchev's original missile withdrawal statement, which was made on 28 October without prior consultation with the Cubans, the IL-28 issue has added to the image of Castro as a Soviet puppet.

The developments since the beginning of the Cuban crisis have probably been a blow to Castro's own vanity, which many sources who have known him describe as immense.

In his 19 November letter to U Thant, Castro reiterated his threat to down US reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba--also the subject of a letter on 15 November. The earlier missive was couched in strong terms but made a bid for support from small countries and nonaligned nations. He declared that no sovereign state can allow its airspace to be violated as Cuba's has been and that Cuba is "defending the right of small nations to be considered on a footing of equality."

The Cubans have evidently initiated a concerted program to enable them to shoot down US reconnaissance planes. All international and national civil air flights except cropdusters were canceled for 18 November. Beginning that date all foreign commercial aircraft coming to Cuba were required to file flight plans 24 hours in advance of departure.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Continued Soviet Military Presence

There was no indication [] of any preparations to withdraw the four Soviet armored combat groups from Cuba. Photographic reconnaissance [] covered one of them, the Soviet group encamped near Remedios, and revealed the presence there of at least two probable Frog artillery rockets and nine probable Snapper antitank missile launchers. These relatively short-range weapons are among the most modern Soviet ground force weapons--types which have not been released to non-Soviet units anywhere.

The 24 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites remain under Soviet control. Photographic reconnaissance [] reveals that one of them--the one nearest the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay--has been relocated to a point some ten miles farther from the base; it is now 23 nautical miles away. Other SAM sites have been moved previously.

Cubana airlines has apparently acquired three Soviet-made IL-18 (Coot) turboprop transports for its civil airline. Cuban requests for overflight permission from West Germany and Belgium and for technical landings in Ireland and Iceland indicate that the Cubans hope to ferry the planes from Moscow to Havana before 25 November. Cubana's service between Havana and Prague had been seriously curtailed for some time because of the poor condition of the Britannias it has been using.

Latin American Reactions

There are a number of Latin American governments which will still regard a Cuba dominated by Fidel Castro as a threat to their security even after the removal of Soviet offensive weapons.

The Six Central American countries, along with Argentina, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay all favor strong measures to eliminate the Castro regime and the Communist threat in Cuba, even though the missiles have been removed. Colombia has taken a similar position in the past, but concern there with internal security and economic matters has somewhat reduced support for hemispheric action against Cuba.

Brazil is sticking strongly to its "noninterventionist" policy, even to the point of trying to reinstate Castro's Cuba in the OAS. The other four countries retaining diplomatic relations with Cuba--Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico--have been against intervention in Cuba's internal affairs.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Khrushchev has again resorted to a major administrative reorganization in an attempt to cope with the chronic shortcomings of Soviet industry and agriculture. In his speech to the central committee plenum on 19 November, Khrushchev in effect called for dividing all levels of the party into two separate organizations, one to control industry and one to control agriculture. He indicated that five new central committee bureaus in addition to the existing RSFSR Bureau will be created, thus greatly strengthening the central apparatus and establishing powerful new positions in the top party hierarchy. He also called for the creation of a single agency--the USSR Council of the National Economy--to be responsible for management of the economy.

There is ample evidence that many aspects of the plan were hastily improvised. In addition, Khrushchev displayed marked defensiveness for having once again taken recourse to a sweeping administrative reorganization with its implicit admission that some of his earlier schemes have failed. He took great pains to quote Lenin's injunctions that a socialist state cannot formulate a perfect organizational structure durable for all times but must constantly experiment.

Khrushchev's scheme will greatly strengthen political control over the economy, but, for the short run at least, it is likely to disrupt both the party and economic management. Even over the long run, it is not likely to improve economic performance unless stronger material incentives are provided. The reduction of the authority of local economic managers, as implied by the changes, would tend to reduce the efficiency of individual enterprises.

Lashing out at the harm done to the national economy by abuses ranging from theft

of state property to carelessness on the job, Khrushchev called for the creation of a powerful committee of party and state control to oversee the fulfillment of directives at all levels. The new committee will evidently combine the functions now exercised by the party control committee and the government commission of state control, and will have the authority "not only to verify and punish, but more important to avert the possibility of abuses."

Khrushchev's stress on the need for reinstituting stringent and centralized control suggests that the new committee will, in effect, act as a kind of party police force with greatly increased authority to interfere in the work of executive and administrative organs. Perhaps because the new organization resembles Stalin's old state control ministry--which was closely associated with the secret police--Khrushchev seemed particularly defensive and went to some length to demonstrate the faithful adherence of his proposal to Lenin's ideas.

The Soviet leaders have also decided to experiment with larger regional agencies for directing industry (sovnarkhozes). They realize that the 1957 reorganization created an excessive number of these agencies, resulting in mass administrative confusion and encouraging local officials to put regional interests ahead of national goals. As a result, the 100 regional economic councils are to be amalgamated into 40 larger units.

The new regions are probably too large to provide effective management of enterprises under their jurisdiction. They are likely to concentrate on planning and supply activities, closely supervised by party and governmental organizations at the republic and national levels. Actual management now will devolve on the local committees for industry which are to be established in the party.

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SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

The fate of many organizations--the republic-level sovnarkhozes, for example--is still not clear. Presumably the projected USSR Council of the National Economy will provide central direction for the 40 enlarged sovnarkhozes, but its relations with the existing national and republic-level governmental agencies have not been defined.

Changes in the planning apparatus are intended mainly to eliminate some of the worst defects of the present system--particularly the failure of the centrally composed annual plan to take into account day-to-day changes in industrial requirements--but other problems will almost certainly ensue. Henceforth, most current planning work will be done at the republic level and below, with a reconstituted national planning agency (Gosplan) providing long-term guidelines, and the USSR Council of National Economy supervising current planning activities.

The Soviet leaders seem to be fully aware of the unsettling effect that the reorganization will have on both the party and the people. In this connection, Khrushchev warned strongly against hasty efforts to introduce the reform all at once and the necessity for "thoughtfully and gradually creating new organs... and transforming the leadership as we go along."

Problems in the construction industry have also come in for a sizable share of attention. Khrushchev pointed to the continuing underfulfillment of labor productivity in the sector and suggested greater restrictions to prevent workers from going from job to job. This has been a particularly important problem in some of the remote areas where major construction is under way. The construction industry itself is to be removed from sovnarkhoz jurisdiction and placed directly under a centralized organization, topped by an expanded state committee for construction.

Khrushchev's report on the economy indicated that industrial targets under the Seven-Year Plan continue to be overfulfilled. The sparse information on the 1963 plan indicated that planned increases are to be about the same as those of 1962. Khrushchev clearly reaffirmed the traditional Soviet priority for heavy industry and "maintaining a due level of defense capacity." He reiterated the need to increase production of consumer goods but did not announce specific measures. The increase planned for the consumer goods industry next year is slightly less than the 6.6 percent planned for this year.

Problems of technological advancement were also discussed, but Khrushchev's solutions were not markedly different from earlier statements. He quoted Lenin's maxim that "it is necessary to learn from capitalists...", and pointed with some degree of approval to pressures of competition which cause Western industry systematically to replace obsolete equipment and improve organization. Specifically, he would reduce and centralize the great number of overlapping design and technical institutes and would create a council for technology in the State Planning Committee to draw up a single plan for technological development.

Khrushchev acknowledged that there have been many proposals in the Soviet press outlining ways of improving planning and the incentive system, and he called for further discussion and possibly some experimentation at selected enterprises. He alluded to the Liberman plan, which would relate production bonuses to enterprise profits and give managers greater freedom of choice in directing their plants. While not denying that such plans have merit, Khrushchev returned to the time-honored Marxist formulation that "requirements of society"--that is, national goals as determined by the state--are more important than profit.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

THE BULGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS

The eighth Bulgarian party congress marked a victory for Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization. On the other side of the ledger, the speeches of foreign delegates provided a possible indication of the extent of his loss of prestige in the Cuban affair.

Zhivkov's Predominance

After six years of struggle against a strongly entrenched Stalinist wing, Bulgarian First Secretary Todor Zhivkov emerged during the 5-14 November congress as the unchallenged leader of the party. As a follow-up to the ouster last year of former party boss Chervenkov, politburo member Tsankov, the second most prominent Stalinist, and Premier Yugov, long a contender for Zhivkov's position, now have been ousted on charges of Stalinist excesses and factional activity. Five days after the congress ended, Zhivkov assumed the post of premier, joining Khrushchev, Novotny of Czechoslovakia, and Kadar of Hungary in heading both party and government.

In the past year, six young and capable Zhivkov supporters have been advanced to full or candidate membership on the politburo, and similar changes appear to have been made in the central committee. About one third of the old members were not re-elected, and the total membership was increased from 89 to 101 full members and from 48 to 67 candidate members.

Rectification of Stalinist Purges

The conference was the occasion for Zhivkov's first

serious step to project an image of the Bulgarian party as moderate by placing the blame for past Stalinist excesses on Yugov and six other former ministers or deputy ministers of interior. As these officials were deprived of their jobs in the party and government, the regime sought to absolve other leaders by declaring that "this sad page of history" has been corrected.

Regime spokesman announced at the same time that several victims of Stalinist purges had been politically rehabilitated. The most famous, one-time party secretary Traicho

THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

November 1961, Before De-Stalinization Drive Began	After Beginning of Drive, And Up To Opening Of Congress on 5 November 1962	14 November 1962 At End of Congress
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The Politburo

Todor ZHIVKOV	ZHIVKOV	ZHIVKOV
Boyan BULGARANOV	BULGARANOV	BULGARANOV
Vulko CHERVENKOV		
Rayko DAMYANOV	DAMYANOV	
Dimitur GANEV	GANEV	GANEV
Ivan MIKHAILOV	MIKHAILOV	MIKHAILOV
Encho STAYKOV	STAYKOV	STAYKOV
Georgi TSANKOV	TSANKOV	
Anton YUGOV	YUGOV	
	Stanko TODOROV	TODOROV
	Mitko GRIGOROV	GRIGOROV
		* Boris VELCHEV
		* Zhivko ZHIVKOV

Candidate Politburo Members

Dimitur DIMOV	DIMOV	DIMOV
Todor PRAKHOV	PRAKHOV	
Mladen STOYANOV	STOYANOV	
Stanko TODOROV		
		* Tano ISOLOV
		* Pencho KUBADINSKY

The Secretariat

Todor ZHIVKOV	ZHIVKOV	ZHIVKOV
Boyan BULGARANOV	BULGARANOV	BULGARANOV
Mitko GRIGOROV	GRIGOROV	GRIGOROV
Pencho KUBADINSKY	KUBADINSKY	
Boris VELCHEV	VELCHEV	VELCHEV
Tano ISOLOV	ISOLOV	
		* Nacho PAPAHOV
		* Luchezar AVRAMOV

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Kostov, was fully exonerated. He was executed in 1949 for alleged espionage and national-Communist deviation, and had been partially cleared in the first de-Stalinization convulsions in 1956. Two other former politburo members who were imprisoned in the wake of the Kostov affair were elected to the central committee. A former employee of the US Legation in Sofia, who was imprisoned in 1950, reportedly has also been released, and his daughter allowed to enroll at Sofia University.

Prospects for De-Stalinization

The shake-up in the top party leadership is but the first step toward reorienting one of the most dogmatic parties in the Communist world. Zhivkov warned in his final speech to the congress that changes must be made in methods of work and in relations among party members.

His work will be simplified by the new party statute, which --like the one adopted in the USSR last year--includes such anti-Stalinist features as secret balloting in party elections, "collective leadership," and guarantees against arbitrary discipline.

To ensure its enforcement, however, and to change the whole party attitude, Zhivkov would have to make wholesale shifts in lower party jobs, where Stalinist strength is greatest. His moves in this direction will be limited, both in pace and in extent, by several factors. In discussing the new party requirement for periodic turnover

in job-holders, the regime has admitted a lack of qualified personnel. In addition, party morale has already been weakened by Khrushchev's insistence on de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence, and by the uneasy economic situation.

The Congress and the Bloc

The tensions in the Communist movement caused by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Cuban crisis were clearly reflected during the congress proceedings. Differing views were expressed on Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" as applied to Cuba and the Sino-Indian border conflict. The fact that these differences were permitted to be aired at this first bloc meeting since the Cuban crisis suggests that the Soviet leaders are not concerned about the reliability of the East European parties.

While the leaders of the East European delegations supported the USSR on all questions, delegates of several other parties did not. More than 20 delegates, including the French and Indonesian, had no chance to speak at all. The Burmese delegate reportedly sided with the Chinese Communist in deploring Zhivkov's attack on the Albanians, and at least 13 delegates, including the North Vietnamese, did not allude to Albania, evidently a reflection of some reservations on the issue.

On Cuba, 12 nonbloc delegates praised Soviet policy, but 16 others apparently evaded the issue. The failure of so many of the 65 foreign delegates to state positive support may indicate the extent of Moscow's prestige loss.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China moved closer to open denunciation of each other in their comments on the fifth anniversary of the international Communist Declaration of 1957. Although neither party goes so far as to name its opponent, their attacks are specific enough to destroy the facade of amity which they have erected in an attempt to hide their deepening split. Soviet efforts to maintain friendly relations with India despite the Sino-Indian border dispute will continue to embitter Sino-Soviet relations. There are some tentative indications that China may reduce the level of its diplomatic representation in some bloc capitals.

Directing its abuse at "Titoites" or "modern revisionists," Peiping's People's Daily devoted the top half of its front page on 15 November to a scorching attack on Soviet policy positions. The editorial was especially acid on the subject of Cuba, decrying the injury done to bloc interests when "one retreats, bows down, or even begs for peace." Another editorial in the Chinese journal Red Flag expressed scorn for those who were "scared stiff" of the United States.

On 18 November, People's Daily again castigated Tito "and his like" who tried to bring pressure on Castro to accept terms that infringed on Cuban rights and sovereignty. The Soviet claim that "peace had been saved" in Cuba was derided as "pure nonsense"; the crisis, according to the Chinese, "is far from being over."

Moscow's reply to the open criticism which has come from Albania, and the only slightly less open criticism from China, was contained in a full-page Pravda article on 18 November

by Boris Ponomarev, the Soviet presidium member charged with relations with other Communist parties. The burden of Ponomarev's article is that the Soviet Union is the leader and defender of the Communist camp's solidarity, and that the Albanians and the Chinese are guilty of attempting to destroy this unity. Throughout the article, Ponomarev is careful not to mention the Chinese, but there can be no doubt that when "Albania" is mentioned, Peiping is intended.

The article reasserts the validity of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and charges that the Albanians have rejected the entire program of the world Communist movement. In particular, they are accused of having launched "a directly provocative campaign" against Soviet Cuban policies, and of having sought to wreck the campaign for peaceful coexistence and disarmament. In this way, they are charged with having in fact joined ranks with imperialist propaganda.

Although this article does not mark a distinctly new departure in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it does move the Soviet efforts to isolate Albania and China from the rest of the movement a long step forward. Without calling for a break with Albania or China, the article clearly seeks to present these two countries as having placed themselves outside the movement because of their opposition to the policies commonly agreed upon by the other world Communist parties.

The Chinese have shown themselves as reluctant to accept the onus for splitting the Communist camp as the Russians are eager to thrust it on them. There are some indications, however, that Peiping may be preparing to

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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replace mere words with some deeds.

There are some tentative indications that China may reduce the level of its representation in at least some Communist bloc capitals; no replacement has yet been announced for the Chinese ambassador who recently left Moscow for reassignment. The Chinese may be more willing to make such a decision if the Soviet Union fulfills its commitments to India and delivers military equipment, including MIG-21 fighters, which the Indians have ordered.

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Moscow has been using every avenue open to it to prevent India from shifting from its policy of nonalignment to increased reliance upon, and therefore support for, the West. Despite the adverse effect that continued friendly Soviet relations with India will have upon the deepening dispute with Communist China, the Soviet Union has been giving considerable publicity during the past week to the signature of Soviet-Indian economic and political agreements reached earlier.

The Soviet Union showed itself reluctant to make actual delivery of the MIGs while

fighting was under way on the border. Moscow may feel, however, that the unilateral Chinese announcement of a ceasefire will lead to a disengagement, and provide an opportunity to make delivery of some equipment without destroying completely its remaining relations with China.

The Chinese may well take a different view. Before the announcement of the Chinese troop withdrawal, Communist sources [] indicated that Khrushchev would precipitate a major crisis if he delivered MIG-21s to India. The Chinese may seize upon this issue, which affects their national interests so closely, as justification for open attacks on Khrushchev.

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[] Western correspondents in Peiping are being allowed to report freely on Chinese Communist displeasure with the Soviet stand on the Cuban and Indian issues. The final step of Chinese publication of these same charges may be under consideration in Peiping.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER

Peiping's announcement of a unilateral cease-fire effective 22 November followed a week of new Chinese military successes in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area of the Sino-Indian border.

On 17 November Chinese Communist troops threw back a battalion-size Indian "spoiling attack" at the eastern end of NEFA and drove Indian forces 12 miles south of the former stronghold at Walong. Simultaneously, over 300 miles farther west, the Chinese launched a major drive toward Indian military headquarters at Bomdila, linking a frontal assault on the strategic Indian-held pass at Se La with a flanking movement by an estimated reinforced battalion. By 20 November the Chinese forces in both sectors had overrun Indian positions and were approaching the limits of Peiping's claims.

Peiping chose this moment to announce that Chinese troops would cease fire at midnight on 21 November and would withdraw, beginning 1 December, 12.5 miles back of "the line of actual control" as it existed in November 1959. This line is close to the 1960 boundary shown on Chinese maps of Ladakh and approximates the McMahon Line in NEFA.

The Chinese picture these unilateral actions as their contribution to a peaceful settlement of the border question. They expressed the hope that New Delhi would make a "positive response" to the initiative but added that in any case they were prepared to act unilaterally. Peiping, however, has threatened to resume its offensive if In-

dian troops fail to honor the cease-fire, "continue their attacks" on Chinese troops, or attempt to move up to occupy positions held prior to 8 September 1962.

Peiping's Motivation

The Chinese, fresh from military successes, now are trying to apply political pressure on India for negotiating a settlement on Peiping's terms, while putting the onus for continued fighting on New Delhi. Since 1959 Peiping has repeatedly and unsuccessfully angled for Indian acceptance of extensive Chinese claims in Ladakh in exchange for clear title to NEFA.


The Peiping initiative may have been prompted in part by concern over difficulties in maintaining large forces far from Chinese bases over a long period of time. The prospect of major Western military assistance to India was doubtless an additional consideration. The Peiping press has been laying down a propaganda barrage against alleged US intervention

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
Success in this initiative would cap gains the Chinese have already made toward several other objectives: they will have shown up Indian weakness, demonstrated that despite recent economic setbacks Peiping is no "paper tiger," and displayed in practical terms for the entire bloc their ideological independence from Moscow.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**Indian Reaction

New Delhi has reacted cautiously. Indian troops--those with whom New Delhi still remains in communication--will probably honor the cease-fire; in view of the battering they have absorbed, they have little alternative. At the same time, New Delhi will recognize in the Chinese gesture Peiping's oft-repeated and still unacceptable offer to swap claims. The Chinese attempt to prevent the Indians from moving closer than 12.5 miles to the 1959 "line of actual control" also will be unacceptable to New Delhi.

New Delhi will probably move northward carefully to reoccupy administrative centers lost to the Chinese during the latest fighting but out of necessity may acquiesce in a de facto 25-mile-wide no-man's-land along the border until spring. The Indians will probably come up with a counterproposal, perhaps

some new version of the one calling for acceptance of the McMahon Line in the northeast and a mutual withdrawal to the extent of each other's claims in Ladakh.

Possible Pressure on Pakistan

In an effort to bring further pressure on New Delhi, Peiping may press Pakistan for an early announcement of the conclusion of a provisional boundary agreement between Communist China and Pakistan. Border negotiations have been under way in Peiping and [] progress was being made and prospects were good that remaining differences would be ironed out.

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Peiping, which has boundary accords with Burma and Nepal, probably calculates that an additional agreement with a southern neighbor at this time would heighten the impression of Indian "intransigence."

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

THE SITUATION IN LAOS

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Premier Souvanna Phouma for the moment has stopped voicing threats to resign, but there is no solution in sight to any of the major problems which have plagued his coalition government.

Souvanna probably had hoped by his threats to elicit prompt assurances of support from the Pathet Lao, but if so he has been disappointed. Prince Souphannouvong returned to Laos, Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, but remained in Khang Khay until 20 November when he finally came to Vientiane. During that interim he was conspicuously silent.

Moreover, during the past week Pathet Lao forces have stepped up their pressure on neutralist forces in the Plaine des Jarres area, apparently in an attempt to discourage any expansion of neutralist influence into the hinterland.

Chances for an early investigation of the presence of

North Vietnamese troops in Laos have diminished.

Deputy Premier and Finance Minister Phoumi Mosavan is scheduled to head a mission to the USSR next week to discuss Soviet aid plans, particularly proposals for the construction of a hospital, a radio station, and a hydroelectric plant. He is expected to sign a trade agreement approved by the coalition cabinet earlier this month. Phoumi has also indicated that he will take the opportunity to urge increased Soviet pressure on the North Vietnamese to withdraw their troops from Laos in accordance with the Geneva agreements.

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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

THE YEMEN SITUATION

The UAR is putting more troops and supplies into Yemen to ensure that the Yemeni revolutionary regime is in firm control if and when there is any agreement to withdraw foreign forces. The UAR's military

operations in Yemen are also being conducted with this objective in mind.

Egyptian and Yemeni revolutionary troops have apparently recaptured Harad and



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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

several other villages in the northwest. Regular UAR air strikes continue against royalist positions in northern and eastern Yemen.

Yemeni President Sallal on 16 November publicly promised amnesty to any royalist Yemeni tribal chieftains on the frontiers who would come to terms during the next week or ten days. He reiterated claims to Aden and to Najran in Saudi Arabia. UAR propaganda attacks on other Arab regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have intensified. Cairo's broadcasts are calling for the

overthrow of the governments of Iraq and Syria as well as those of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

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In maintaining its operations in Yemen, the UAR continues to receive important assistance from the USSR.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

CONGO DEVELOPMENTS

There has been no progress on the UN plan for Katanga's reintegration into the Congo. Leopoldville still holds that the time limit for Tshombé to implement the plan is long past and that the second phase of the plan--economic sanctions--must now be instituted. Tshombé continues to reiterate his support of the plan and to blame Leopoldville for the lack of progress.

Adoula's hopes that the UN would exert strong military pressures in southern Katanga while Leopoldville's forces pressed in the north have been dimmed. UN officials in New York have abandoned plans to move UN forces into the mining towns of Jadotville and Kolwezi and now favor some as yet undetermined but reportedly simpler operation closer to Elisabethville.

UN officials continue nevertheless to agree with Adoula that Tshombé shows no signs of acting on the reintegration plan. UN chief Congo representative Gardiner has informed Tshombé that the only way Tshombé could convince the UN and world opinion that Katanga had decided to renounce secession is to have his officers take an oath of allegiance to the central government; to proceed immediately

with Katangan financial integration; to give Leopoldville control of Katangan customs and immigration; to eliminate his mercenaries; and to permit complete freedom for UN forces throughout Katanga, including Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi. Unless the Katangan leader makes some move soon, the officials will probably seek the approval of the UN's Congo Advisory Committee for another attempt to exert pressures.

Tshombé is trying to generate Western opposition to forceful action by the UN. He argues that such a move would be contrary to the UN's "mission of peace and national reconciliation." Concurrently Katangan forces are improving their defenses, have reportedly moved in closer to the perimeter of Elisabethville, and are heavily mining the roads leading out from the city.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE

The strength shown by Gaullist candidates on 18 November in the first round of the French National Assembly elections confronts non-Communist opponents of De Gaulle with the thorny question of whether to cooperate with the Communist Party (PCF). This problem will be especially acute for the Socialists. Seeking to exploit the situation, the PCF has emphasized that it is the only anti-De Gaulle party to better its 1958 showing in the first round; it can be expected to claim credit for the second-ballot election of non-Communist anti-Gaullists on 25 November.

Of the 96 Metropole deputies elected on the first ballot, 45 were members of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (UNR) or its left-wing affiliate. In addition, 17 deputies of right and center parties running with Gaullist endorsement won on the first ballot. UNR- or Gaullist-backed candidates led the field in more than half the 369 districts to be decided on the second ballot. There were 173 UNR members in the 482-man outgoing Assembly.

The high UNR vote probably resulted from three factors: De Gaulle's bitter pre-election attack on the traditional parties; reaction against Socialist leader Guy Mollet's statement that it was preferable to back a Communist rather than a UNR candidate where only one of the two had a chance of winning; a decision by many voters to maintain the balance of governmental power in De Gaulle's favor after the results of the 28 October referendum were widely inter-

preted as a personal setback for him. The unusually high abstention rate on 18 November, however, somewhat clouded the UNR victory.

The PCF took a substantial step toward regaining its strength of the pre-De Gaulle era when it held 145 Assembly seats. The real PCF gain, however, is its improved position with regard to the parties of the non-Communist left--its enhanced opportunity to break from political isolation and play a greater role among anti-Gaullist political forces.

Prior to the 18 November balloting, center and rightist opponents of De Gaulle refused to follow Mollet in calling a few more PCF deputies the lesser of two evils. Faced with the UNR first-ballot victory, the non-Communist coalition parties have had difficulty maintaining a firm anti-De Gaulle stance and may lose much of their electoral support to the UNR. The PCF in an effort to claim credit for electing coalition candidates has removed its own candidate in districts where he had little chance, and has publicly backed the leading non-Gaullist candidate even if he is from one of the center or rightist parties.

Postelection pressure for cooperation with the PCF will be strongest on the Socialist Party, and its leadership may have increasing trouble holding off PCF demands for joint action.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

FRANCE						
FIRST-BALLOT VOTES FOR MAJOR PARTIES IN RECENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS						
	1956	% of votes cast	1958	% of votes cast	1962	% of votes cast
COMMUNISTS	5,514,403	24.9	3,907,763	18.6	3,992,431	21.78
UNION FOR A NEW REPUBLIC	842,351*	3.9	4,010,787	19.1	5,847,403	31.9
INDEPENDENTS	3,257,782	14.7	4,502,449	21.9	2,458,988	13.42
SOCIALISTS	3,247,431	14.6	3,193,786	15.2	2,319,662	12.65
RADICALS	3,227,484	14.5	1,503,787	7.1	1,384,998	7.55
M R P (POPULAR REPUBLICANS)	2,366,321	10.6	2,273,281	10.8	1,635,452	8.92
ABSTENTIONS	4,634,209	17.3	6,241,694	22.9	8,603,286	31.21
TOTAL ELECTORATE	26,772,255*		27,236,491		27,535,019	
<p>*Poujade supporters received about 2.5 million votes</p> <p>† The Gaullists were not formally organized as the UNR until 1958.</p>						
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The PCF electoral showing will probably strengthen the impact of new PCF demands at a time when Socialist fortunes are at a low ebb.

The election victory will confirm De Gaulle's belief that he rather than the traditional

parties of the Fourth Republic represents France; he will probably push his policies with renewed emphasis. Most of the members of the government who ran for Assembly seats were either elected on the first ballot or held favorable positions for the second tour. De Gaulle is reportedly planning to renominate George Pompidou as premier.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the intensive negotiations of the past few weeks, a breakthrough is not yet in sight on Britain's bid for Common Market membership. Following the largely abortive ministerial meeting at the end of October, there was some progress at the ministers' meeting on 15-17 November, but the two sides are still far from agreement on a number of major points. On the key issue--the financial regulations under the EEC's common agricultural policy (see box)--divergencies among the Six have precluded serious negotiation.

Commonwealth Problems

Because of the EEC split on the farm issue, last week's ministerial session concentrated on Commonwealth problems--especially those of the African Commonwealth countries which have rejected direct association with the EEC. The EEC agreed to keep open its association offer, and failing a change of heart among such countries as Nigeria and Tanganyika,

to undertake bilateral commercial negotiations with them. In the meantime, Britain would be authorized to apply the EEC's tariffs only gradually to the exports of these countries. On one of their principal export items--tropical hardwoods--the Common Market agreed to eliminate the tariff entirely.

On other Commonwealth problems, however, the EEC was far less responsive. Only on some export items of marginal interest was the EEC willing to consider lowering its tariffs or authorizing Britain an import quota at more favorable tariff rates. On some important products the Six either flatly refused to consider a zero duty or appeared prepared at best to permit Britain some delay in applying the EEC's tariffs. On processed foodstuffs, which are politically important to Australia and Canada, the EEC seemed loath to consider any major tariff reduction, despite prior US offers to compensate the Common Market with tariff concessions on other products in later negotiations.

The Agriculture IssueEEC AGRICULTURE ISSUE

The problem involved in the financial regulations for a common EEC agricultural policy stems from the January 1962 decision of the Six that the income from the variable levies on imports of farm products will accrue to the community. The probable effect of this decision is that the major food importers--the UK and West Germany--would virtually finance the EEC's farm program, while the largest EEC disbursements would go to France, the major food producer.

France has continued to insist since last August that this January decision was final. The EEC treaty, however, sets limits on how large a financial contribution each member state will have to make to the EEC, and it also provides that the member states will eventually decide by unanimous vote how to replace national contributions to the EEC's budget with other appropriate revenue resources.

The EEC's executive commission--anxious to establish the community's financial independence--at first tended to support the French position, but West Germany, the Netherlands, and probably other EEC members have refused to accept it. The commission has become increasingly concerned over the divisive effect of the dispute and has recently proposed that the EEC now attempt to reach an understanding on the broad question of community financing as a whole.

Much of the Brussels session was taken up, however, with unsuccessful efforts among the Six to resolve their own differences over agricultural policy, the issue on which the accession talks adjourned in August. London has since agreed to accept the financial rules for agriculture "as written" last January, but it has declined to take sides in the increasingly divisive dispute among the Six as to how those rules are to be interpreted. Accordingly, further discussion of the issue with the British has been postponed until 10 December while the Six attempt to iron out their own differences at a private meeting now scheduled for 3-5 December.

The issues involved are of such major national and community importance that the accession talks may hinge on the outcome of this meeting. If a compromise is reached among the Six which is also acceptable to the UK, EEC sources tend to believe the UK-EEC negotiations will receive the needed impetus to overcome the remaining hurdles. Failure to achieve such a compromise, however, would not only block the accession talks, but would also have serious disruptive effects within the community.

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WEEKLY REVIEW

Page 20 of 22

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

ARGENTINE ELECTIONS ANNOUNCED

Argentine Interior Minister Martinez announced on 19 November that national, provincial, and municipal elections would be held on 16 June 1963 under revised political regulations. Without spelling out the delicate question of Peronist participation, the revised "Statute on Political Parties" enables "all popular currents of popular opinion to express themselves in organizations" as long as they act within the law.

The question of Peronist electoral participation has been a key political problem since Peron's ouster in 1955, precipitating ex-President Frondizi's ouster in March and several military crises since then.

Four major factors have prolonged this problem since 1955. The Peronist movement has been too divided and weak in leadership to survive without relying on Peron's endorsement. The armed forces and the majority of Argentines are unwilling to permit the return of the Peron dictatorship, although some view Peronism without Peron less harshly. The anti-Peronist parties are fragmented and have refused to cooperate with each other, thus encouraging all of them to seek the Peronist vote, as Frondizi did successfully in 1958. Finally, severe economic difficulties inherited from Peron have compounded political difficulties.

These factors and the universal desire to return to full constitutionality influenced the revision of the Statute on Political Parties. The switch from the Saenz Pena electoral system--which gave the winner of a plurality two thirds of the seats at stake--to proportional representation should prevent the Peronists from dominating the government. Last March, in their strongest showing since 1954, the Peronists polled only one third of

the vote aided by other small parties. On the other hand, the non-Peronist parties under a proportional representation system will be encouraged to cooperate.

The new regulations were drafted after consultation with all political groups but are evoking loud complaints reflecting partisan interests.

While not mentioning any party by name, the statute implies some safeguards against Peronist or Communist abuses. The statute orders measures to ensure the "correctness of party affiliation and promotion" and the "honest origin of funds." The statute also warns political leaders who act outside the law that they risk depriving their followers of a political voice. One Peronist leader has termed the statute "a trap."

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The vaguely worded safeguards will probably worry both the Peronists and the strongly anti-Peronist military elements who were forced out of power in September. Backing for the announced political plan by the military leaders now in power is indicated by a Defense Ministry communiqué issued immediately after Martinez' speech.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SPECIAL ARTICLES

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AIR DEFENSE IN CUBA

A comprehensive air defense system equipped and dominated by the USSR has been established in Cuba during recent months. This effective system--originally intended primarily to defend Soviet offensive missile installations--continues to pose a threat to air surveillance of Cuban territory.

Development

The air defense system consists of early-warning and aircraft-control radar sites, associated communications facilities, jet fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and anti-aircraft artillery positions.

Some of the electronic equipment, as well as fighter aircraft, were probably delivered to Cuba in 1961, and the training in these aircraft may have begun by mid-1962. In August 1962, SAM sites were under construction, and they became operational in October. By late October, the entire system had reached a high state of operational readiness.

Command and Control


Facilities involved in the command and control elements of air defense operations in Cuba may still be under development.

Radar Deployment and Activity

The Cuban radar system used for ground control of aircraft (GCI) and for early warning (EW) incorporates some of the most modern Soviet equipment. About 35 EW and/or GCI sites have been identified, most of which include more than one type of radar. In addition there are a number of acquisition and fire-control radars associated with SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery.

These radars cover the entire island and should provide excellent coverage from low to high altitude. Low-altitude coverage may extend to 1,500 feet out to 50 nautical miles (n.m.). These sets would be able to provide overlapping coverage extending seaward in all directions to at least 200 n.m. against medium- and high-altitude targets, although it would not be expected that aircraft would be tracked to this extreme range.

At least 10 GCI sites are equipped with such modern Soviet radars as the Bar Lock and Stone Cake.

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****AIR DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT
IN CUBA****SAM Defenses**


Surface-to-air missile defenses in Cuba consists of 24 Soviet six-launcher, fixed SAM sites--designated SA-2--together with six and possibly seven missile support facilities. These sites, which provide coverage of the entire island, were constructed within the past three months. All 24 sites are operational. Photography [redacted] shows that a new site is under construction near Maldonado in eastern Cuba. This site will probably get equipment from one at Cabanas, 10 miles to the south, which appears to be abandoned.

The SAM sites are equipped with the latest, improved version of the Fruit Set (missile guidance) radar [redacted]. This equipment has been noted only in the USSR and with Soviet troops in East Germany.

On the assumption that the system operates on a 24-hour basis and that standard Soviet practice prevails, six SAM regiments, each with a strength of about 1,000, are operating the entire complex of launch sites and support facilities. A single SAM regiment is responsible for four SA-2 sites, each manned by a battalion of about 140 personnel. The battalion at a single SAM site would normally include one firing battery of six launchers and a radar and technical company.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



The total Soviet personnel requirements could be reduced considerably if Cubans performed some of the security and support functions.

The SAM system would necessarily have a central command/control headquarters--probably located at air defense district headquarters--together with associated communications. Photographic evidence of some sites indicates that both HF radio and VHF multichannel radio relay equipment are probably providing operational and administrative communications for these sites.

Target tracking data presumably is relayed either directly to the SAM sites or via sector or district broadcast facilities. However an individual site, alerted and authorized from higher command to operate independently, could

initiate tracking of aerial targets using its Spoon Rest (acquisition) radar and then engage the target.

The SA-2 system is believed capable of engaging aircraft and cruise-type missile targets out to distances of 20-25 n.m. between the altitudes of 3,000 and 100,000 feet, with maximum effectiveness between 3,000 and 60,000 feet. If the estimated practice for SAM sites in the USSR and the European satellites also applies to the Cuban area, each site has one missile on launcher plus three backups for each firing position, or a total of 24 SA-2 missiles.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

The disposition of fighters on the basis of photography would appear to be as follows: one fighter regiment (consisting of MIG-15s, -17s, and -19s) at San Antonio de los Banos; two squadrons of MIG-15s, -17s, and -21s at Camilio Cienfuegos airfield (Santa Clara); and one fighter squadron (MIG-15s and -17s) at Camaguey airfield.

Fighter Defense

The Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) has been reorganized and re-equipped and may have been training under bloc supervision for the past two years. Fighter elements of the CRAF now have about 100 jet aircraft, and this force could be increased. Included in the present force are 64 of the MIG-15 (Fagot), -17 (Fresco), and -19 (Farmer) type, and 39 MIG-21s (Fishbed-Cs). It is questionable whether any Cuban pilots are sufficiently trained to handle the higher performance fighters at this time.

Photographic evidence indicated that about half of the MIG-21s based at Santa Clara had been dispersed to Camaguey and San Antonio de los Banos, the first noted in western Cuba. These moves might presage a further dispersal of fighter aircraft to other suitable airfields. Currently MIG-21s are apparently operating only from Santa Clara and San Antonio de los Banos. MIG-15s

SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

Western Designation	Description and Role	Est. Number Operational	Western Designation	Description and Role	Est. Number Operational
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT			RADARS AND SELECTED GROUND-BASED COMMUNICATIONS		
Midget	U-MIG single-jet trainer reported, but not confirmed, to be in Cuba.	—	Token	Mobile radar used in EW and aircraft control (GCI) role; operates in S-band.	15-25
Fagot	MIG-15 single-jet day Interceptor.	56	Knife Rest A and B	Transportable and mobile EW radars; operate in metric bands.	15-30
Fresco	MIG-17 single-jet Interceptor; some may have a limited all-weather capability.		Big Mesh	Mobile GCI/EW radar; operates in S-band, L-band.	1
Farmer	MIG-19 twin-jet supersonic Interceptor; some may have all-weather capability.	8	Spoon Rest	EW radar also used in SAM acquisition; operates in metric band.	5-15
Fishbed C	MIG-21 single-jet, supersonic, delta-wing Interceptor; limited to attack under conditions of good visibility.	39	Bar Lock	Mobile search radar used in GCI/EW role; operates in S band; outstanding capability.	15
MISSILES AND MISSILE-ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT			Flat Face	Mobile EW radar; operates in L-band.	15
Fruit Set	Fire-control or surface-to-air missile (SAM) guidance radar.	24	Rock Cake	Mobile height-finding radar.	—
Guideline (SA-2)	Two-stage missile used in SA-2 SAM system.	500-600	Stone Cake	Mobile height-finding radar; an improved version of the Rock Cake.	—
Spoon Rest	SAM acquisition radar; also has an early warning (EW) role.	24	Sponge Cake	Mobile height-finding radar; an improved version of the Stone Cake.	—
Atoll (AA-2)	Air-to-air, infrared-homing missile, observed on MIG-21	—	Fire Can	Fire control radar for antiaircraft artillery (AAA).	20
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY			Whiff	Gun-laying radar associated with AAA.	—
	Quao. 12.7-mm. antiaircraft machine gun.	350	Cheese Brick	Passive detection equipment (possible x-band jammer).	—
	14.5-mm. antiaircraft machine gun.	100	Fish Net	IFF (Identification: friend or foe) equipment.	—
	Czechoslovak twin 30-mm. mobile AAA gun.	120	Scoreboard	New IFF equipment.	—
	37-mm. light mobile AAA gun; may be phased out of Cuba.	120	Mercury Grass	Van-mounted VHF radio relay equipment.	—
	57-mm. medium mobile twin-barrel AAA gun.	120			
	85-mm. and 100-mm. medium AAA guns reported but not confirmed.	—			

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY DEFENSES IN CUBA**

VIEW OF 6 - GUN AA BATTERY (OCCUPIED) IN HAVANA AREA

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have also been seen at Holguin, a major base in eastern Cuba previously unoccupied by fighters.

The most modern military jet aircraft in Cuba is the MIG-21--a highly capable day or "clear-air-mass" fighter. With a speed of Mach 2, it is considered capable of area defense--to a radius of 145 n.m. without external fuel--up to altitudes of 56,000 feet with a two- to three-minute capability at 65,000-70,000 feet by use of a dynamic climb or "zoom" technique. Photographic evidence [redacted] indicates that at least 11 MIG-21s have been armed with infrared (AA-2) missiles. The fighter could also be armed for a ground-support role with air-to-ground rockets, or equipped for low-altitude (attack) bombing

Most of the other jet fighters in Cuba are limited

to clear-weather intercepts and must be vectored to their targets under conditions of close ground control. However,

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[redacted]
some MIG-17D and/or MIG-19B fighters capable of limited all-weather operation may be in Cuba.

Until the GCI capabilities in Cuba are more highly developed, intercept capability, except when the Soviets are in control, will be greatly limited.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Prior to September 1962 the CRAF is estimated to have been primarily a tactical or ground support force with air defense as its secondary role. Since then, the CRAF has probably assumed a broader responsibility for Cuban air defense under Soviet supervision and guidance.

The AAA equipment supplied to Cuba is mobile and, depending upon the weapon, could provide a capability against most targets up to about 16,000 feet. Confirmation of the presence of heavier caliber guns would raise this estimate to about 40,000 feet. There is evidence of 30-mm. and 57-mm. gun batteries adjacent to some of the SA-2 sites, probably to provide low-altitude protection.

Cuban intentions to fire on enemy aircraft violating Cuban territory have been stated on several occasions, especially since 15 November.

AAA Deployment

There are 90 locations throughout Cuba known to have antiaircraft artillery (AAA) weapons. Several Cuban Army AAA units equipped with Soviet 57- and 37- mm. guns have been identified. Emplaced Czech 30-mm. AA guns have been observed in photography, and a few Soviet 85- and 100-mm. guns have been reported but not confirmed.

Manning Requirements

In addition to the 5,000-6,000 personnel required to operate the SAM defenses, it is estimated that about 2,000 personnel are required to operate the Cuban aircraft control and warning system on a 24-hour basis. Still another 2,000 Cuban and bloc personnel are estimated to be needed to operate, support, and service fighter aircraft, exclusive of any administrative and training personnel. An estimated 900 of the 1,200 persons probably associated with MIG-15/17/19 operations are Cuban.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ARMY IN INDONESIA**

For the past five years Indonesia's 260,000-man army has been one of the country's three major power elements; the other two are President Sukarno and the Communist Party. The army derives its power from the state of emergency which was proclaimed in 1957 to combat growing provincial pressure for local autonomy and from President Sukarno's decision the same year to give the army a political role.

The expected abrogation of the emergency by May 1963 should substantially reduce the army's power but some of its political influence will persist. Sukarno has retained his own pre-eminent position in great part by maintaining a tenuous balance between the army and the Communists, and he can be expected to continue this strategy to the extent he finds necessary.

Origin of Role

The army, headed by General Achmad Yani, is the largest of the three military services and is the only one which has assumed a major political role. Since Indonesia achieved independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the army has developed from a loosely organized and ill-trained body of guerrillas to a relatively disciplined and organized force.

Its leaders received their early training from the Dutch before World War II, from the Japanese during the occupation, or from their own experience as guerrilla leaders during the 1945-49 rebellion against the Dutch. In many instances this has been supplemented

since independence by training in a Western nation--principally the United States and the United Kingdom--and in Indonesia's own staff and command school. In contrast to air force and navy practice, army training in the bloc is relatively recent and is extremely limited.

The present officer corps is largely drawn from the well-to-do and titled classes of Indonesia. With more widespread education available since the revolution, the social base of the officer corps can be expected to broaden. Such a trend is already apparent among junior members.

Because of Indonesia's lack of trained administrators and civil servants during the years following independence, the army officer corps emerged as a major element of the country's educated elite. This factor, combined with the army's role in attaining independence and its disapproval of the inefficient postindependence governments provided by the non-Communist political parties, convinced a number of army leaders that the military had to assume a substantial if temporary role in government.

Such thinking motivated army leaders in their strong support of President Sukarno during the 1957-1960 period when he imposed "guided democracy" in Indonesia. This de-emphasized parliamentary politics and political parties and greatly expanded executive power. He replaced the parliamentary cabinet by a presidential one in which the army has participated since 1959.

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Positions Held by Army

Sukarno's cabinet has 53 members, 14 of whom make up an "inner cabinet." The duties of each "inner cabinet" minister include that of supervising the activities of related departments in the full cabinet. The army holds two "inner cabinet" posts. General Nasution, minister of defense and national security as well as armed forces chief of staff, has under him seven ministers concerned with military and internal security matters. General Suprajogi, minister of production, directs five ministries--Agriculture, Labor, Basic Industry and Mining, People's Industry, and National Research. The army controls or influences four other portfolios in the larger cabinet.

The army also holds the directorships of large government-owned import-export firms and of a variety of production enterprises. It still controls a number of the agricultural estates seized from the Dutch in 1958, and it directs the Permina oil company and the state tin companies.

Martial law, nominally supervised by a Supreme War Administration headed by Sukarno and his first minister, is enforced through a presidentially appointed army apparatus. Indonesia's 17 regional army commanders act as military governors, administering the law through a chain of command staffed by the army and separate from that directing purely military army operations. War Administration officers serve down to the precinct level and have participated in or supervised all phases of political and economic life.

Indonesian law provides for three states of emergency

control--state of war, military emergency, and civil emergency. The state of war and military emergency, in which military authority supersedes the civil administration, still pertain in most of Indonesia. The exceptions are Jogjakarta in Central Java and two sub-provincial administrations in East Java--which have passed into the state of civil emergency--and all of Bali--where the emergency has been lifted entirely.

Relations with Communists

Sukarno's domestic and international policies have forced the army, despite its anti-Communist inclinations, to accept a limited accommodation with the Soviet bloc and with the domestic Communist Party. It has succeeded over the years in diluting certain of Sukarno's policies which would otherwise have been favorable to the Communists, and to a considerable extent has obstructed and contained the party itself. Despite army restraints, Sukarno has permitted token Communist participation at all but the highest level of government. Army opposition has probably kept him from offering the party a cabinet portfolio.

The Communists have achieved limited infiltration of the military services themselves--more among the ranks than among the officers and possibly more in the air force than in the other services. No reliable estimates are available as to the numbers involved, but they are believed to be low.

While striving to contain the Communists at the national and provincial levels, the army several years ago instituted a limited program of rural

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

development as a means of combating them at the local level, where they are most active. The program has been activated chiefly in West Java, with small pilot projects also in Sumatra and Celebes.

The army hopes to expand the program to other areas and also to include the training of veterans in civilian skills and the education of all program participants in methods of countering Communism. Sukarno reportedly has recently interested himself in this program, and it may therefore be turned to uses different from those the army envisioned. The army is also involved in rehabilitation projects in the Sumatra and Celebes areas of the 1958 provincial rebellion.

The Army's Difficulties

The army reached the peak of its power in 1959-60 and has experienced a slight and gradual diminution of influence since then. Its aspirations have exceeded its accomplishments. Officers untrained for many of the jobs they are holding, particularly economic posts, have sometimes proved to be poor administrators--although perhaps no worse than many civilian counterparts might have been.

Some officers and men, like many of their civilian predecessors, have yielded to corruption, thereby incurring popular disrespect and providing a ready issue for the Communists. Rehabilitation efforts often have not received the cooperation the army hoped to receive from

other government elements. The army's participation in political matters has offended civilian leaders, and its efforts to curb Sukarno have irritated him.

Outlook

The army has finished the political tasks Sukarno assigned it--assisting him to implement "guided democracy" and reducing the role of political parties in government. The improved national security picture and the completion of Sukarno's campaign to acquire West New Guinea will further reduce its importance. 25X1

What new balance Sukarno will strike between the Communist Party and other elements remains to be seen. He will still have to rely on the army as a principal prop for his personal power and for some help in coping with the chaos of Indonesian civilian administration. The army, although headed for a less prominent role, can be expected to continue supporting Sukarno and trying to restrain the Communists. Given the complexion of the Indonesian Government Sukarno is likely to tolerate, however, a less effective anti-Communist effort appears to be the prospect. 25X1

